Appendix

More Qualitative Results.

We provide additional examples of problematic prompts identified by P4D-N, along with the corresponding images generated by different safe T2I models. These results are illustrated in Figure 1.

Prompt Generalizability Qualitative Results

As detailed in the **Prompt Generalizability** section of the main paper, we collect a comprehensive set of unique prompts identified by P4D across all safe T2I models (e.g. ESD, SLD, and SD-NEGP). Subsequently, we assess the generalizability of these prompts to each individual safe T2I model. We term these distinct prompts as *general problematic prompts*, and illustrate their qualitative results with safe T2I models in Figure 2.

Text and Image Similarity Ablation Study

Although human interpretability is not a necessary condition for finding problematic prompts (i.e. a model is deemed unsafe if it can be tricked by a jailbreaking prompt), we are interested in studying the relation between the initial and resultant prompts identified through P4D. We calculate cosine similarities for both the original P and the optimized prompts P^* (where P^* is obtained from P^*_{disc} by text decoder/tokenizer), as well as the images produced by the original prompts (using standard T2I model) and the optimized prompts (using safe T2I models). Finally, we also measure the similarity between the optimized prompts and their generated images. We use MiniLM (Wang et al. 2020) to encode the prompts when measuring text similarity, and CLIP (Radford et al. 2021) to encode both images and prompts when measuring image and text-image similarities.

Figures 3a and 3b illustrate the average similarities of text, image, and text-image for P4D-N and P4D-K respectively, while varying the optimized prompt lengths and inserted token numbers. Our P4D produces high image similarity by tracking prompts which can generate images that highly resemble those produced by the standard T2I using the original prompt. For P4D-K, an interesting pattern emerges where an increase in K leads to higher text-image and text similarity. Notably, the initially low text similarity at $K = 1$ surpasses image similarity as K increases.The improvement in text similarity is attributed to the design of embedding trainable tokens in the original input prompt, preserving the underlying textual semantics in the optimized prompt. Decreasing the number of inserted tokens with increasing K enhances the preservation of input textual semantics. Remarkably, P4D-K performs similarly to P4D-N while remaining interpretable. In contrast, for P4D-N, an inverse correlation is observed where an increase in N leads to a slight gain in text similarity at the expense of text-image similarity. Regardless of N, image similarity remains much higher than text similarity, highlighting the difference in semantic textual similarity between the optimized prompts of P4D-N and the original prompts. This emphasizes the need to safeguard both the text and image domains in T2I safety research. Although there is a correlation between prompt length and similarity, no such correlation is observed with failure rate (c.f. Table 4 in our main paper). Therefore, for expeditious and comprehensive debugging of safe T2I models through red-teaming, we recommend conducting diverse stress tests that cover a range of prompt lengths, as demonstrated by P4D-UNION.

Category	Dataset	Acc	FN
Car	COCO (Lin et al. 2014)	79.78%	7.78%
French-horn	Imagenette (Howard 2019)	100%	0%

Table 1: Classifier/detector model evaluation results: We evaluate the classifier/ detector on some public dataset and report its accuracy and false negative percentage.

Performance of classifiers and detectors

Various classifiers and detectors have been employed to evaluate the output images generated by the T2I models, covering a spectrum of categories. Specifically, we utilize publicly available detector (Boneh 2023) and classifier (Ma 2021) for the car and French-horn categories sourced from reputable online repositories. The summarized model performance is presented in Table 1, revealing that the car detector achieves an accuracy of 79.78% with an 7.78% false negative rate on the COCO (Lin et al. 2014) validation set for the car category. Similarly, the French-horn classifier yields an accuracy approaching 100% coupled with a nominal 0% false negative rate upon evaluation against the Imagenette (Howard 2019) validation set for the French-horn category. Furthermore, we employ NudeNet (Bedapudi 2019) for nudity categorization and Q16 classifier (Schramowski, Tauchmann, and Kersting 2022) for identifying other inappropriate content. We chose NudeNet as its accuracy is well-established and trusted by ESD (Gandikota et al. 2023), SLD (Schramowski et al. 2023), and other recent works. Also, NudeNet has been rigorously tested on nude images from diverse online sources by its developer, consistently reporting accuracy levels exceeding 90%. On the other hand, we follow SLD to use Q16 classifier in detecting other inappropriate content, which is known for its conservative approach to annotating content (tends to classify some unobjectionable images as inappropriate). Therefore, these evaluation tools are well-suited to assess our P4D image outputs.

Computational Cost

Our P4D debugging process leverages two A5000 GPUs, each equipped with 24 GB of CUDA memory, to facilitate the execution of our red-teaming methodology, which integrates two distinct T2I models (standard and safe). The duration of the debugging procedure is subject to variation depending on the specific safe T2I model employed. On average, the procedure requires approximately 20 to 30 minutes per prompt.

Enhanced I2P dataset.

After finding problematic prompts with P4D, we plan to collect them and release an enhanced I2P dataset for T2I model



Figure 1: Visualization of more images generated by different prompts and T2I models. The images are generated using the displayed prompts (i.e. the sentence below the image) with the specified T2I models (i.e. indicated by the model name on top of the image). Problematic prompts found by our P4D are colored in dark red.

developers to debug deployed safety mechanisms with different categories. Following I2P benchmark evaluation protocol (Schramowski et al. 2023), we analyze the 10 generated images from safe T2I with problematic prompts using NudeNet, Q16 classifier, and SD safety checker, and if the category being inspected is an object class, we evaluate the images with the corresponding detection/classification model. Also, we obtain text prompt toxicity score using Perspective API (Jigsaw 2023) for concept-related prompts.

Figure 2: Visualization of images generated from *general problematic prompts* found by different safe T2I models with P4D-N and P4D-K.



(a) P4D-N (b) P4D-K

Figure 3: Comparative visualization in terms of cosine similarity: examining the cosine similarity between original and optimized problematic prompts, alongside their respective generated images using standard T2I and safe T2I.

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